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Abstract
We analise emission permit auctions under leader-follower competition when the leader bids strate-
gically and the follower acts as price-taker both at the auction and the secondary market. We obtain
linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction, which is
optimal ex-post for the leader. Under specific distributional assumptions we conclude that the auc-
tion always awards less permits to the leader than the cost-eﬀective amount. Our central result is
a cautionary note on the properties of auctioning under market power. Under interior solution the
auction allocation is dominated by grandfathering in terms of aggregated cost with probability one.
As a policy implication, the specific design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-eﬀectiveness.
The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting
the market power that is present in the secondary market.
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1 Introduction
Emission trading has become an increasingly popular policy instrument to regulate polluting emissions.
Important applications include the US SO2 trading system under the framework of the Acid Rain Program
of the 1990 Clean Air Act and, more recently, the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS).
This policy approach is particularly popular among economists as it theoretically allows emissions to be
reduced in a cost-eﬀective way by means of a price system. As long as marginal abatement costs diﬀer
across firms, trading among them can help to achieve a pre-specified environmental target at a minimum
cost.1 One of the main decisions to be made when implementing a so-called cap and trade (CAP) system
is the rule to do the initial distribution of permits among firms. The most popular methods are auctioning
and grandfathering. The latter, which consists of distributing the permits for free based on past emissions,
has traditionally been the most widespread method although we are currently witnessing a tendency to
revert this situation.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which began in 2009 and includes 9 northeastern
US states, represents a substantial break with the past since, instead of giving the permits away for free,
the participants decided to auction close to 90 percent of their permit budgets (see Burtraw et al. 2009).
In the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), considered to be the largest environmental
market in the world, the role of auctioning is becoming increasingly relevant as for the third trading period,
starting in 2013, auctioning of allowances will be the default allocation method. The arguments posed
by the European Commission (EC) to support the introduction of auctions in the third period are that
auctioning "best ensures the eﬃciency, transparency and simplicity of the system, creates the greatest
incentives for investment in a low-carbon economy and eliminates windfall profits".2 Permit auctioning
is also typically seen by economists as an allocation mechanism with rather desirable properties. See e.g.
Cramton and Kerr (2002) and Hepburn et al. (2006).
This paper studies auctions of permits in markets involving leader-follower competition. We analyse the
bidding behaviour of the firms, the equilibrium of the auction and its eﬃciency. We take grandfathering as
a comparison benchmark to determine if moving from a grandfathering scheme to auctioning can deliver
any eﬃciency improvements. Our results raise a cautionary note about the properties of the auction in
those frameworks in which there is some big firm that can exert market power both in the auction and the
secondary market. We conclude that, in these conditions, the auction outcome can be really unfavourable
in terms of overall cost.
We adopt an auction-theory approach by modelling a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The
1As an additional argument, Antoniou et al. (2014) show in a model of strategic environmental policy that permits trading
is a dominant strategy and it ensures that welfare is strictly higher than in a situation where permits are non-tradable. When
the permit market is eﬃcient, it create incentives for exporting countries to tighten regulation in order to enhance their firms’
competitiveness.
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/faq_en.htm, section "Why are allowances being auctioned?".
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firms are characterized by idiosyncratic types whose realizations are privately observed while their distri-
bution is common knowledge. After the initial allocation is made in the auction, the firms engage in a
secondary market in which one firm acts as a leader and the other one as a follower. Consistent with this
assumption, we consider that the firm that is a leader in the secondary market is also so in the auction
in the sense that it bids strategically anticipating the eﬀect of its own bid on the equilibrium price, while
the firm that behaves as a follower in the secondary market bids non-strategically in the auction by taking
the price as given. In this way, we try to represent market situations in which big influential firms coexist
with small powerless firms. An example of this situation can be the power sector in the European Union
(see e.g. Hinterman 2011). In such a framework, our claim is that the fact of auctioning the permits does
not necessarily remove market power and thus the bidding behaviour of both types of firms will have a
diﬀerent impact on the equilibrium of the auction.
Under these conditions, and assuming that he conditional expectation of the rival’s type is linear, we
endogenously obtain linear optimal strategies for both firms and we characterize a unique equilibrium of
the auction. A remarkable property of the auction equilibrium is that it is optimal ex-post for the leader
in the sense that he can play in such a way that he enjoys the same profit that he would get if he could
observe, not only his own type, but also his rival’s type at the time of bidding. The interpretation of this
result is that the auction reinforces the leadership position and endows the leader with the capacity to
drive the market equilibrium to the most favourable position for him. This seems to suggest that, as far
as the leader-follower relationship of the secondary market has a reflection in the auction, this allocation
mechanism is likely to suﬀer from the type of ineﬃciencies that are typically associated to market power.
Once we get this general result, in order to get more accurate insights we introduce specific distributional
assumptions on the types. We assume the join probability distribution is uniform and we consider three
supports, all of which lie within a bounded square. The first support is the whole square, so that the
types are mutually independent. The other two supports are upper and lower triangles within the square,
respectively, such that types are positively correlated in both cases and either the leader or the follower
has a lower type with probability 1 (w.p.1), which in our framework has the interpretation that it has
lower marginal abatement costs than its rival.
Under these assumptions we conclude that only in the case of independent distribution the allocation
of permits under grandfathering is symmetric in the sense that it under- and overstates the cost-eﬀective
one with the same probability. In the other two cases it displays some kind of bias in the sense that
it tends to over-allocate the follower with a probability higher than one half in case 2 and the opposite
happens in case 3. The auction, in turn, introduces a systematic bias in the sense of assigning to the
leader less permits than the cost-eﬀective amount w.p.1 in all three cases, and accordingly the leader will
always act as a monopsonist in the secondary market. This result is in the same line as the one by Antelo
3
and Bru (2009) and Montero (2009), who show in a deterministic framework that it is optimal for the
leader not to take part in the auction and buy all the permits in the secondary market instead. Under an
incomplete information scenario we obtain a less extreme and more realistic result in the sense that the
leader’s allocation is lower than the optimal amount, but not necessarily zero.
Importantly, in any of our distributional scenarios and assuming interior solution we conclude that
the auction allocation is dominated by grandfathering in terms of aggregated cost. It deserves to be
stressed that this dominance is not only in terms of expected costs, but in a remarkably stronger manner:
for each possible realization of the types within the relevant range the auction leads to larger realized
cost than grandfathering, which implies first-order stochastic dominance of grandfathering with respect to
auctioning.
As a central policy implication we conclude, not only that the mere fact of auctioning the permits does
not ensure a gain in terms of eﬃciency, but rather, on the contrary, if the auction inherits the leader and
follower roles from the secondary market, if we move from grandfathering to auctioning the results are
prone to be worse rather than better.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first strand has to do with CAP systems under
market power. It is well documented that under perfect competition and complete information, the sec-
ondary market equilibrium is cost-eﬀective for any initial allocation of the permits (see Montgomery, 1972).
Unfortunately, this desirable property fails to hold if the secondary market is not perfectly competitive.
As Hahn (1984) first showed, the eﬃciency loss due to market power depends on the initial allocation of
permits. The dominant firm will manipulate the price (upwards if he is a seller and downwards if he is a
buyer) in the secondary market, unless the initial allocation equals the cost-eﬀective one, which requires
a perfectly informed regulator. Hagen & Westskog (1998) extended the Hahn setting in a dynamic two-
period model. An overview of this literature can be found in Montero (2009). To what extent market
power is a real problem in practice has to be determined for each market separately (see, e.g., Sturn,
2008). In the case of the UE ETS, some authors have reported the presence of market imperfections and
evidence of price manipulation. For example, Ehrhart et al. (2008) claim that there are loopholes in
EU emissions trading law that foster tacit collusion and impacts oligopolistic product markets (p. 347).
Hinterman (2011) concludes that the largest electricity producers in Germany, the UK and the Nordpool
market could have found it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards and he claims that this
could explain the elevated allowance price level during the first 18 months of the EU ETS.
The second strand of literature is auction theory and, more specifically, multi-unit multi-bid auctions,
in which more than one unit is being auctioned (multi-unit) and bidders can bid for more than one unit
(multi-bid). Our framework is characterized by non-common value and the existence of a secondary market,
which is not typically the case in most papers in this literature (see, for example, Wang and Zender (2002)
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or Alvarez and Mazón (2012)). More general settings, as the one by de Castro and Riascos (2009) do
not fully characterize the equilibrium as we do, but just optimal responses. In our framework, the non-
common-value nature of the auction is not an ad-hoc assumption but the natural consequence of how we
model the secondary market. Specifically, the common-value assumption fails to hold for two reasons.
First, the value of an additional permit is not constant across firms due to their diﬀerent role as a leader
and a follower respectively. Second, the value of an additional permit is not constant for a specific firm
either, because marginal abatement cost is not constant and depends on the total amount of permits held
by each firm.
Under common value, eﬃciency is not a relevant question since any allocation of units across bidders
is eﬃcient. In much simpler settings, such as single-unit auctions, the resulting allocation is also eﬃcient.
For a large range of auction formats it is always the case that the bidder with the highest valuation is the
one who gets the unit on sale. But in our multi-unit multi-bid non-common-value framework eﬃciency of
the auction allocation turns out to be a relevant question as results that holds true for simpler auctions do
not apply to this setting. As eﬃciency is one of the main arguments of the EC to support the introduction
of auctions in the EU ETS, we consider relevant to pay particular attention to this issue.
The increasing interest in permit auctioning has given rise to some related empirical and experimental
studies (see e.g., Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994), Godby (1999, 2000), Muller et al. (2002) Burtraw
et al. (2009), Reeson et al. (2011), Mougeot et al. (2011), Cong and Wei (2012), Grimm and Ilieva
(2013)), but there is still a lack of theoretical developments and, as far as we know, the properties of
auctions of permits have not been thoroughly studied. In one of the few related theoretical papers,
Antelo and Bru (2009) compare auctioning and grandfathering in a permit market with a dominant firm
when the government is concerned both about cost-eﬀectiveness and public revenue, but one of our main
building blocks, incomplete information, is absent in their work. As the planner is assumed to be perfectly
informed, the cost-eﬀective solution can be trivially achieved as it can be readily implemented by means
of grandfathering. This is not our case as we assume incomplete information. The closest paper to ours
is Alvarez and André (2014), which compares auctioning and grandfathering, but is restricted to a setting
in which both firms are assumed to act non-strategically at the auction. This assumption seems a-priori
favourable for the auction by depriving the firm which enjoys market power in the secondary market of
the possibility to act strategically and reinforce his market power. Even in this favourable environment,
Alvarez and André (2014) conclude that the auction equilibrium is never cost-eﬀective, because the leader
will either over-bid or under-bid to place him in the most advantageous position for the secondary market.
In general, auctioning is not very successful in the comparison versus grandfathering performed in that
paper. In some of the cases they consider, auctioning results in higher expected costs while in other cases
the comparison is inconclusive as it depends on the parameter values.
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This paper complements Alvarez and André (2014) by considering a situation in which the leader acts
strategically in the auction while the follower still acts as a price taker. This assumption is based on the
belief that, if one firm has market power in the secondary market, due to its size or dominant position, it is
likely that this power has a reflection in the auction. Our results reinforce the ones by Alvarez and André
(2014) in a particularly strong way as we conclude that, under rather reasonable conditions, auctioning is
always dominated by grandfathering in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness. Moreover, the dominance is not only
in terms of expected cost but with probability one.
The reminder has the following structure. In Section 2 we present the main elements of the model,
the technical assumptions and the structure of the secondary market. Section 3 carries out a general
treatment of the auction in the sense that no specific distributional assumption is imposed. Section 4
introduces specific distributional scenarios and compares auctioning and grandfathering in terms of cost.
Section 5 concludes. Appendix 1 summarizes the notation and all the proofs are gathered in Appendix 2.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setting
Consider two polluting firms. One of them (labelled as ) acts as a leader and the other one ( ) is a
follower. We use the index  to denote an arbitrary firm. Both firms have the ability to do some abatement
eﬀort to reduce their emissions. The marginal abatement cost function () of both firms is linearly
decreasing in the amount of emissions:
 () = − 0 =  − , with ,  ≥ 0, (1)
where  represents the eﬀective emissions of firm  and  is the slope of the marginal cost function, which
is assumed to be deterministic and constant across firms. Finally, the intercept  is a firm-specific random
variable.3 We call  the type of firm . For simplicity, we do not explicitly consider output production.
For notational convenience, denote the vector of types as α = (  ). As is usual in auction theory,
we assume that there exists incomplete information and thus, at the beginning of the game each firm
observes its own type but only knows the distribution of the rival’s type, which is common knowledge.
This assumption is consistent with the fact that, in reality, a firm itself is the one that has more accurate
information about its own technology and the eﬀect of random shocks on the firm’s results.
Total abatement cost () associated to an amount of emissions  is computed as the area below the
marginal cost curve:
3With a slight abuse of notation, throuthoug the paper we denote indistinctly a random variable and an arbitrary realization
of it.
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 () =
Z 

 ()  = − + 
2
2 , (2)
where  is the laissez-faire or BAU emissions, i.e., the amount that firm  would emit if it were not
subject to any legal obligation to curb emissions. Such a value is computed as the amount of emissions
that would minimise . By making the marginal abatement cost equal to zero, we obtain
 =  . (3)
The environmental authority sets a quantitative objective of ¯ units of emissions and implements a
CAP system by issuing ¯ emission permits and auctioning them between the firms. Both firms bid with
incomplete information as explained above and, in the auction equilibrium, each firm  receives 0 as
an initial allocation, with 0 + 0 = ¯. After the initial allocation is made, the types are publicly
revealed and the firms engage in the secondary market and trade allowances with full information. There
are two arguments to back the assumption that the types are known in the secondary market but not
in the auction. The first is that transactions in the secondary market are more frequent than auctions,
and thus, it is realistic to assume that in the secondary market the agents handle more information. The
second is that the auction regulations typically ensure the anonymity of the participants, while this is not
necessarily the case in the secondary market.4 Denote as 1 the amount of permits that firm  holds after
trading in the secondary market, which has to coincide with its realized emissions (1 = ). Therefore,
the amount of permits sold (if 0  1) or bought (if 1  0) in the secondary market by firm  is
|0 − 1|. Denote as 0 the price of the permits in the auction 1 is the price in the secondary market.
For the sake of analytical tractability, the permits are assumed to be perfectly divisible and hence we take
the number of permits as a continuous variable.5
The cost-eﬀective allocation ¡ ,  ¢ can be computed by equating marginal abatement costs across
firms and imposing the market-clearing condition  +  = ¯:
 = − +¯2 ,  = −+¯2 , (4)
where  stands for "cost-eﬀective". As we know from the previous literature (see Montgomery, 1972),
under any initial distribution the cost-eﬀective allocation would be reached as a market equilibrium if the
secondary market were perfectly competitive. In that case, the equilibrium price  , where  stands for
4Consider over the counter (OTC) transactions, which have been rather important in the EU ETS, specially in the initial
phases. See Ellerman et al. (2010).
5 See Wilson (1979) or, more recently, Wang and Zender (2002) or Alvarez and Mazon (2012) for auctions of perfectly
divisible goods.
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"competitive", would be given by
 =1 (1) =2 (2) =  +  − ¯
2
. (5)
For notational convenience we define  := 0¯ as the proportion of permits held by the follower, so
that the leader holds a proportion 1− . In the cost-eﬀective allocation this proportion is given by
 =  −  + ¯
2¯ =
1
2
+
 − 
2¯ , (6)
from which it is straightforward to conclude that when both firms are identical ( = ), it is optimal
that each firm gets one half of the permits and if    it is optimal that firm  receives more permits
than .
For some results we need to assume that conditional expectations of the types are linear. We present
this linearity assumption next, together with some notation.
Assumption 1 Firm ’s expectation of the rival’s type conditional on the own type is a linear function,
denoting its coeﬃcients as follows:
{ | } =  + ,   ∈ {} ,  6= . (7)
Throughout the paper we deal with interior solutions in the sense that both firms receive a non-negative
amount of permits both in the primary and the secondary market and the prices of both markets are also
non-negative. In section 3 we take interiority as an assumption without questioning the conditions under
which this is endogenously true. In section 4 we identify conditions under which the solution is indeed
interior.
2.2 The secondary market
In the secondary market we assume that firm  chooses its required amount or permits, or alternatively
the price, anticipating the follower’s reaction. The latter moves second and decides its demand for permits
acting as a price-taker. The firms aim at maximizing their profits, given by
Π (1) := 1 (0 − 1)−  (1) = 1 (0 − 1)−
Z 
1
 () , (8)
where the fist term is the revenue or the expenses due to permits trading and the second is abatement cost.
The diﬀerence between both firms’ behaviour is that the follower chooses its net demand while taking 1
as given, whereas the leader takes into account the eﬀect of his own behaviour as well as the follower’s on
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the market price. As proven by Alvarez and André (2014, Proposition 1) the number of permits hold by
each firm in an interior secondary-market equilibrium is given by
∗1 =  − 3 +
¯+ 0
3
, (9)
∗1 =  −  + 
¡
2¯− 0¢
3 , (10)
and the associated equilibrium price is
∗1 =  + 2 − 
¡
2¯− 0¢
3
 (11)
The resulting firms’ profits are given by
 (0α) = Θ +  + 2 − 2¯
3
0 + 
6
20, (12)
 (0α) = Θ + 2 + 7 − 2¯
9
0 − 5
18
20, (13)
where Θ and Θ are two terms that depend on the parameters of the model as well as the types but
are independent of the initial allocation. As a consequence of market power, the equilibrium depends on
the initial allocation and thus the secondary market renders the cost-eﬀective solution only if the leader
initially receives exactly the amount of permits that corresponds to the cost-eﬀective allocation. Moreover,
using (4) in (9) it can be shown that, if 0   , then   1  0. Symmetrically, if 0   we
conclude   1  0. Thus, if the auction assigns to the leader less permits than in the cost-eﬀective
allocation, in the secondary market he will act as a monopsonist and will buy less permits than what
would be cost-eﬀective. If, on the contrary, he receives more than the cost-eﬀective amount, he will act as
a monopolist and will sell less permits than required to reach cost-eﬀectiveness.
Summing up, as far as the initial allocation is not cost-eﬀective, the secondary market generates a
movement from the initial allocation towards the cost-eﬀective one without reaching it. A technical impli-
cation of this fact is that a suﬃcient condition for the secondary market equilibrium to be interior is that
the initial allocation and the cost-eﬀective one are both interior.
Using (2), (9) and (10), bearing in mind that 0 + 0 = ¯ and summing across firms we can express
the aggregate abatement cost as a function of the follower’s initial allocation, 0 (see Alvarez and André,
2014, Corollary 1):
 (0α) :=  +  = Θ+  −  − ¯
9
0 + 
9
20, (14)
where Θ is a term that depends on the parameters and the types but not on the initial allocation. An
9
implication of (14) is that the total cost entailed by an allocation system can be assessed just by checking
how close the initial allocation is to the cost-eﬀective one. Using (14) allows us to skip computing the
secondary-market allocation to evaluate an allocation system, since such eﬀect is already incorporated in
(14). By applying a simple linear transformation, we define the following auxiliary function in terms of :
(α) := 9¯ [ (0α)−Θ] = 
2¯+ ( −  − ¯). (15)
For simplicity, and with a slight abuse of terminology, sometimes we will refer to  as "cost", though
it actually is a linearly increasing transformation of it. This is innocuous since we are using costs just to
determine which allocation method, auctioning or grandfathering, is more cost-eﬀective and the relative
position is not altered by a monotone transformation.6
3 Auctioning: the general case
Assume now that the permits are auctioned by means of a uniform auction, which means that all the
awarded units pay the stop-out price.7 Consistent with our assumption of a leader-follower relationship,
we consider that, if one firm has market power in the secondary market, due to its size or dominant
position, it is likely that this power has a reflection in the auction.8 To capture this notion, we assume
that the follower neglects the eﬀects of its own bid on the auction price and thus acts as a price-taker,
whereas the leader bids strategically in the sense that he is capable of predicting the follower’s strategy
and taking into account the eﬀect his own and the follower’s bid on the clearing price.9 We are faced with
a multi-unit multi-bid auction as there are multiple units to be auctioned and every bidder can request
more than one unit. Moreover, due to the asymmetry between firms, and to the fact that  is not
constant, it is a non-common value auction.
A strategy for firm  is a mapping from the support of its type into the set of feasible bids. Specifically,
a strategy is a demand function of the form  ( 0), where the requested amount  depends on the price
0 and firm ’s type, but not on the rival’s type, and  stands for "bid". For the sake of tractability, we
restrict ourselves to continuous strategies and interior solutions, which implies that, in equilibrium, both
the leader and the follower require an amount of permits between 0 and ¯, in such a way that  + = ¯
and rationing is ruled out. Denote as  (0 ) := { (0α) |  0} the value function of firm  at
6Note that  () is proportional to the diﬀerence between  and Θ. From (14) we can interpret Θ as the total cost
associated to a situation in which the follower receives no permits (0 = 0), which we can take as a comparison benchmark.
So, a positive (negative) value of  means that the realized cost is higher (lower) than that in the benchmark situation.
7An alternative common format is the discriminatory auction, in which every awarded unit pays its bid. See, e.g., chapter
12 of Krishna (2002) for a detailed explanation.
8Another way to justify this setting is to interpret that "the follower" is not a single firm but a fringe of firms, each of
whom considers that it is too small to influence the auction price.
9 In fact, in many -and very important- real life auctions, such as Treasury auctions, there are both price-taker and
price-setter players acting simultaneously.
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the auction, i.e., the expected profit of firm , provided that it gets 0 permits in the auction conditional
on his own type, where  is given by (12) or (13). Note that a firm’s value function depends on its beliefs
about the rival’s type.
Both firms are assumed to be risk-neutral and thus aim at maximizing their expected profits. An
equilibrium in the auction is a pair of best strategies, ∗  ∗ , and a stop-out price ∗0 that clears the
market. Firm ’s best strategy is the demand function that maximises its value function, as defined above,
minus the cost incurred to get 0 permits in the auction, 00. As both players behave in a diﬀerent way,
we have to address their strategies separately.
Regarding the follower, as it acts non-strategically its problem is
∗ ( 0) := argmax { (0 )− 00}, (16)
where the price is taken as given. Using the definition of the value function, together with (13), and
manipulating the first order condition of problem (16), we get the following expression for the follower’s
best strategy:
∗ (  0) = 2{ |  }+ 7 − 2¯− 905  (17)
which is continuously decreasing in the auction price, 0. Moreover, it is increasing both in  and the
expected value of . As  shifts the follower’s abatement cost up, the higher  the more  is willing
to pay for the permits. Regarding , although it aﬀects ’s, and not  ’s cost, the follower forecasts that
a higher value of  will make the permits more valuable in the secondary market, which would also make
 more willing to pay in the auction. Finally, the bid depends negatively on the total amount of issued
permits, ¯, because the firm forecasts that it will be easier to obtain cheaper permits in the secondary
market and thus is less willing to pay.
The leader’s best strategy is a bid function ∗ ( 0) that represents a best response to  ’s strategy.
To model the leader’s problem, define total demand in the auction as Φ (α 0) := ( 0)+  (  0),
from which the opt-out price can be obtained by imposing the market-clearing condition Φ (α ∗0) = ¯
and solving for ∗0 we get ∗0 = Φ−1
¡α ¯¢.10 Therefore, the leader’s problem is
∗ ( 0) = arg max{0}  (0 )−
©Φ−1 ¡α ¯¢× 0 | ª . (18)
Note that ’s problem depends on  ’s strategy through Φ (α 0). Moreover, unlike the follower, 
does not take the price as given, but he plays by predicting the equilibrium price that will result from his
own and  ’s demand.
10 (17) reveals that  the former is decreasing and Proposition 2 shows that  also is, which ensures that Φ is invertible
in 0.
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One important property of this problem is that there exists an strategy for  that is optimal ex-post in
the sense that it guarantees the ’s profit maximizing price in the auction w.p.1. As a first step to prove
this result consider the following artificial auxiliary problem:
max
{0}
 ¡¯−  (  0) α¢− 0 × £¯−  (  0)¤ , (19)
 (  0) being given by (17). This problem is artificial in the sense that it is written as if the leader
could observe the real value of  and pick the value of the equilibrium price of the auction that maximises
his profit. The solution of this problem is given in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If the solution of problem (19) is interior, it is given by
∗0 = 44 + 15 + 4 { |  }− 44¯63 ¥ (20)
Lemma 1 shows the expression of the clearing price that maximises the leader’s realized profit. The
essential characteristic is that, as expected, ’s profit maximizing price depends positively on both  ’s
and ’s type, which determine how strongly each firm needs the permits to reduce its abatement costs.
It also depends on the follower’s expectation about the leader’s type because such expectation aﬀect the
follower’s prediction about the scarcity of permits and thus, its willingness to pay for them. The leader’s
expectation about the follower’s type is not involved because  is taken as known in problem (20). Note
also that the coeﬃcient of  in (20) is larger than that of  , which implies that, due to the leader’s
strategic behaviour , his optimal price is more responsive to the follower’s than to his own type. Finally,
∗0 decreases as the amount of issued permits increases, as less scarcity entails a lower market value.
Proposition 2 shows that, under the assumption of linear expectation (7), the equilibrium strategy of
the leader is such that the equilibrium price of the auction is given exactly by (20).
Proposition 2 Under Assumption (7), and considering interior solution, there is a unique equilibrium of
the auction in which the leader’s strategy has the form
∗ ( 0) = 0 +1¯+2 +30, (21)
where 0 ≤ 0, 1 ≤ 0, 2 ≥ 0 and 3 ≤ 0 depend only on  and . Moreover, the equilibrium price
of the auction for any α = (  ) is the solution to (19) ¥
To understand this proposition, it is important to underline that (19) selects the leader’s optimal price
in the auction for any given pair (  ), and so it represents an ideal situation for the leader since he
would not be aﬀected by incomplete information. Proposition 2 states that there exists a demand function
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such that the equilibrium price of the auction replicates the solution to problem (19) and such a function
depends only on known information for the leader ( is absent). We say that the auction allocation
is ex-post optimal for the leader in the sense that the leader can play in such a way that the ultimate
equilibrium will be the one that he would choose if he had full information. In other words, if the leader
happened to know the value of  , he would not change his strategy.11 Note also that, although this is
a remarkably strong result for the leader, the bidding function used to get that result is rather standard
as it is a linear function with intuitively reasonable properties: it is decreasing in the price and the total
amount of issued permits and increasing in ’s type.
Little more can be said at this level of generality. In order to get more accurate insights about
the properties of the auction allocation and its comparison to grandfathering we need some distributional
assumption about the types, which we introduce in Section 4. Nevertheless, even without such assumptions
we have the important insight that the leader is in a privileged situation to exert market power, which is
expected to be negative for the eﬃciency of the equilibrium. This intuition is confirmed by the analysis
that we carry out in the next section.
4 Auctioning vs grandfathering under specific distributional as-
sumptions
4.1 Modeling grandfathering
In practice, grandfathering is usually applied by allocating permits proportionally to observed past emis-
sions as a proxy for BAU emissions. The idea is to take, as a benchmark, what firms would do if they
were not subject to the CAP system. Nevertheless, past emissions data are not always available or, even
if they exist, they are not always reliable enough, as it was the case, for example, in the first stage of the
EU ETS.12 As is done in Alvarez and André (2014), we capture this idea by assuming that under grand-
fathering the permits are allocated based on expected BAU emissions, which, using (3), can be expressed
as
 © ª = ½
¾
=
 {}
 .
According to this assumption, the follower receives 0 = ¯ permits and the leader receives 0 =
11Wang and Zender (2002) obtain a similar result on the ex-post optimality for the strategic bidders under a uniform
auction format, though they consider quite a diﬀerent setting, with common value and across-bidder symmetry assumptions.
12For example, Ellerman et al. (2010) claim that, during the first period of the EU ETS, "the task of setting a cap that
was at or close to business-as-usual (BAU) emissions was made enormously more diﬃcult by poor data. The problem was
that no member state government had a good idea of the exact emissions within the ETS sectors ... and the data problem
was even worse in the new member states of the eastern Europe". Moreover, "the problems created by poor data were
not limited to cap-setting; they extended into the allocation of allowances to installations, which required installation-level
emissions data ... Not surprisingly, since allocations to these installations depended on the data submitted, industrial firms
were forthcoming, although there has always been a suspicion that the intended use of the data imparted an upward bias to
these data" (p. 37-38).
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³
1− 
´
¯, where  stands for grandfathering and
 =  { } {}+ { }  (22)
Consider, as a particular case, that  {} =  { }, which implies  = 12 and thus the permits are
split evenly between both firms. Using (6) it is immediate to conclude that, in this particular case, the
grandfathering allocation coincides with the cost-eﬀective one if and only if the realization of both firms’
types are the same, it overstates the cost-eﬀective allocation if    and it understates it if    .
Using (15) and taking expected values, we get total cost under grandfathering and its (unconditional)
expected value in this case:
(α) = 2(− )−¯4  {(α)} = −¯4 . (23)
To analyse diﬀerent cases we need to make some assumptions about the distribution of the types.
4.2 Distributional assumptions
Consider the  plane, in which α := (  ) represents an arbitrary point. In that plane, we assume
that the support of the pair α is contained in a square Ω, with lower-left and upper-right corners denoted
as ( ) and ( +   + ) respectively, where ,   0. Formally, Ω := [  + ] × [  + ]. Thus, 
captures the size whereas  accounts for variability in the types. Within this square, we consider three
possibilities, all of which are consistent with our linear expectation assumption (7).
Assumption 2 The support of the pair (  ) is a square in the  plane whose lower-left and
upper-right corners are ( ) and ( +   + ) respectively. Within that square, we consider three diﬀerent
probability distributions for ( , ):
• Case 1 ("Independent types"): uniform on the whole square Ω. In this case the coeﬃcients of the
linear conditional expectation as defined in (7) are given by
 =  =  + 2   =  = 0, (24)
and the (unconditional) expectation of both types is given by  { } =  {} =  + 2
• Case 2 ("-ex ante eﬃcient"): uniform on the lower diagonal triangle of Ω, that is, uniform on all
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points satisfying  ≤  . Therefore,13
 = 2   =
 + 
2
  =  = 1
2
 (25)
 { } =  + 2
3
  {} =  + 
3
 (26)
• Case 3 (" -ex ante eﬃcient"): uniform on the upper diagonal triangle of Ω, that is, uniform on all
points satisfying  ≤ . Thus,
 =  + 2   =

2
  =  = 1
2
 (27)
 { } =  + 
3
  {} =  + 2
3
 (28)
In case 1 we assume that the types are independently distributed (which implies  {} =  { }).
In cases 2 and 3 the types are positively correlated. In case 2 we say that  is ex-ante (more) eﬃcient
(than  ) in the sense that the abatement cost function of  is below that of  w.p.1. In case 3  ≤ 
holds w.p.1 and we say that  is ex-ante eﬃcient. If  ≥  holds, the marginal abatement cost function
of firm  is higher than that of firm , i.e.,  () ≥ () for any amount of emissions.14
Up to now we have assumed interior solution without checking under which conditions this is true. Un-
der our specific distributional assumptions, we are in the position to determine the conditions under which
our model renders an interior solution. For that purpose, we include the following technical assumption,
which allows us to introduce Corollary 1.
Assumption 3 The parameters of the model satisfy the following condition:
63
44
 ≥ ¯ ≥ 2 (29)
Corollary 1 If Assumption 3 holds, under any of the three distributional scenarios considered in Assump-
tion 2, both the equilibrium allocation under the auction as described in Proposition 2 and the resulting
allocation of the secondary market are interior w.p.1 ¥
Assumption 3 ensures that in all three cases included in Assumption 2, and for any realizations of the
types, the equilibrium of the auction and the secondary market is interior in the sense that, in equilibrium,
both firms demand a quantity of permits that is non-negative and is smaller than its BAU emissions. To
13 In case 2 the unconditional expectations are given by solving the integrals { } = 22
 +

    and
{} = 22
 +

   respectively. The results in case follow from the same calculations just by swapping the
firm subscripts.
14This diﬀerence in marginal cost can be due to technological reasons in the sense that a firm may have access to a more
eﬃcient abatement technology than the other. But there are other possible interpretations, for example, in terms of size: for
a bigger firm it may be harder to cut down emissions.
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guarantee that this is true, two conditions need to hold: First, the dispersion of the types’ distribution
cannot be too large with respect to the bottom value and, second, the total amount of permits, ¯, cannot
be too large or too small to prevent, on the one hand, that it is profitable for any firm to buy more permits
than the BAU emissions and, on the other hand, that the permits are so scarce that any firm prefers to
keep a negative amount of them. Under grandfathering, the initial allocation is trivially interior as far as
the expected value of both types is positive, which does not require any additional assumption.
4.3 Eﬃciency analysis
As we have discussed in Subsection 2.2, the eﬃciency of an allocation method can be determined just by
studying which proportion of the permits that method assigns to each firm and how close that allocation
is to the cost-eﬀective solution. We are now in the position to compare auctioning and grandfathering.
Firstly, consider grandfathering under each of the three distributional scenarios introduced above. In
case 1 we know  {} =  { } and thus the ratio of permits received by the follower is  = 12 . Since the
distribution is symmetric it is straightforward to conclude that Pr
n
  
o
= Pr
n
  
o
= 05,
i.e., grandfathering overstates the cost-eﬀective allocation with probability 05 and understates it with
exactly the same probability.
In case 2 ( ≤  ), using (26) we have  = 3+26+3 . In case 3 ( ≤ ), using (28) we have
 = 3+6+3 . There is an obvious symmetry between cases 2 and 3 due to the fact that the domains are
symmetric and the leader-follower relationship is irrelevant both for grandfathering and the cost-eﬀective
allocation. In both cases, only the relative values of the realizations of the types are taken into account.
So, if we compare grandfathering with the cost-eﬀective allocation, it follows that the probability that 
is smaller than  in case 2 is the same that  is larger than  in case 3. Proposition 3 bounds this
probability.
Proposition 3 Consider the semispace of parameter values satisfying Assumption 3. The following results
hold under cases 2 and 3 of Assumption 2, respectively:
i) In case 2, 05  Pr
³
 ≤ 
´
≤ 1 and this probability is arbitrarily close to 1 for some parameter
values within the semispace.
ii) In case 3, 05  Pr
³
 ≥ 
´
≤ 1 and this probability is arbitrarily close to 1 for some parameter
values within the semispace ¥
Note that there is a diﬀerence between case 1 on the one hand, and cases 2 and 3 on the other hand. In
case 1 grandfathering is symmetric in the sense that it overstates or understates the cost-eﬀective allocation
with equal probability. In cases 2 and 3, on the contrary, there is certain bias in the sense that both events
do not happen with the same probability. Specifically, in case 2 (3) the event that the follower receives an
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amount of permits smaller (larger) than the cost-eﬀective amount happens with a larger probability than
the opposite event. Actually, as it is shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the infimum for the probability
of this event is around 07. This value is the probability that  ≤  holds in case 2 for the most adverse
parameter combination within the range defined by (29). In the most favourable extreme case, we obtain
that Pr
³
 ≤ 
´
happens with probability 1. Although the latter is an uninteresting degenerate case
that involves ¯ =  = 0, it serves to show that grandfathering tends to over-allocate the leader in case 2
with a high probability that can become arbitrarily close to one and exactly the opposite happens in case
3.
In the auction, cases 2 and 3 are not symmetric, because the diﬀerent roles played by each of the firms
has an impact on the equilibrium allocation. Actually, Proposition 4 shows that the auction allocation is
always biased in the same direction and, more strikingly, this happens with probability one.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption (3), in cases 1, 2 and 3 of Assumption 2, the proportion of permits
awarded to the follower in the auction is larger than its cost-eﬀective allocation and larger than the amount
that it would receive under grandfathering, i.e.,    ,   , w.p.1 ¥
According to Proposition 4, the leader will always receive less permits from the auction than the cost-
eﬀective amount,  , and, therefore, will act as a monopsonist in the secondary market. According to
the discussion presented in subsection 2.2, we also know that   1  0, i.e., the leader will buy
less permits than what would be required to achieve the cost-eﬀective allocation. As a consequence of this
result, it can also be proved that
0  1   .
The intuition behind this result is that leader understates his demand in the auction to keep the price
0 low. When he goes to the secondary market to buy more permits, the resulting equilibrium price 1
increases to some extent with respect to the one in the auction, but it will still be lower than the price
that would prevail under perfect competition,  . This result is somewhat related to the one by Antelo
and Bru (2009). In a framework of complete information they conclude that it is optimal for the dominant
firm to abstain from the auction and buy all the permits in the secondary market instead (Prop 1, p. 325).
Under incomplete information, we get a softer result in the sense that the leader tends to demand less
than socially optimal, but the demanded amount is no necessarily zero.
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Figure 1: Deviation of the auction (vertical axis) and grandfathering (horizontal) w.r.t. .
1,000 realizations of α with  = 10, ¯ = 10,  = 4. Colors indicate number of realizations in each spot.
To determine which of the two allocation methods is more cost-eﬀective, we first present an intuitive
graphical discussion based on a numerical example and then we confirm that intuition with a very conclusive
analytical result in Proposition 5. Figure 1 compares both allocation methods under each of the three
distributional scenarios considered above. The plots represent 1,000 random realizations of α. For each
realization we compute the allocation under auctioning and the cost-eﬀective one,  and . In each of
the three cases  has a constant value because the grandfathering allocation is driven by the unconditional
mean of the types rather than the realized values of the types. The horizontal axis displays the diﬀerence
between  and  and the vertical one the diﬀerence between  and .
The main messages that we can extract from the figure are the following. As predicted by Proposition
4, the auction systematically assigns to the follower more permits than what would cost-eﬀective and, as a
consequence, the vertical coordinate of all the dots in all three graphs is positive. On the contrary, as we
know from Proposition 3, the follower might receive more or less permits than the cost-eﬀective amount,
depending on the realizations of the types and, therefore, the horizontal coordinates can be positive or
negative. Note also that the horizontal coordinates are always lower than the vertical ones, consistent with
the result that   , as stated in the Proposition 4.
From the analysis conducted in Section 2.2 we know that the eﬃciency of an allocation can be assessed
by the proximity of that allocation to the cost eﬀective one. The graphical results, together with Proposition
4, allow us to derive straightforward conclusions for some of the cases. Specifically, when  is above
 we must have      and thus we know for sure that the cost associated to the auction
allocation is larger than that under grandfathering because it is further away from the cost-eﬀective one.
The comparison is not so straightforward if grandfathering understates the cost-eﬀective solution, i.e.,
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    .
Consider first the left panel of Figure 1, which corresponds to case 1 and thus  = 05. The right
part of the graph, i.e., to the right of the vertical axis, displays realizations in which    and
thus   05, which happens with probability 05. In this part, both the auction and grandfathering
overstate the follower’s allocation and Proposition 4 allows us to conclude that for each of those realizations

³
α
´
 
³
α
´
, i.e., auctioning is always dominated by grandfathering in terms of costs. The left
part of the graph corresponds to    and thus   05. In this case we have    and
the ranking is not so straightforward. Nevertheless, on the vertical axis we have  =  and therefore
 =  . Using a continuity argument, if we consider those realizations that are close enough to the
vertical axis, where  and  are roughly equal, we know from (6) that  is close to 05 and thus, close
to the grandfathering allocation. So, to the left of, but close to the vertical axis, the comparison also favours
grandfathering. As we move further to the left, the comparison is not so straightforward and, in principle,
the ranking could get reversed. But under uniform distribution we know that the mass of probability
decreases when we move to the corners and therefore, it seems that the event 
³
α
´
 
³
α
´
can only happen with a small probability. As a general assessment of this case, one can conclude that
grandfathering tends to beat auctioning in the majority of cases.
Consider now the right panel, which corresponds to case 3. Following the same reasoning as above we
conclude that grandfathering beats the auction for all the realizations to the right of the zero line, which
in this case are the vast majority and, using the continuity argument, the same can be said in an interval
to the left of the zero line. Therefore, this case seems even less favourable for the auction.
The less clear case is the one in the center, as most realizations lie to the left of the zero line. Anyway,
the comparison is still clearly favourable to grandfathering for all the realizations to the right of the zero
line and those in an interval around this line. For the rest of the realizations, the only thing we can say
is that the results are not conclusive. As al overall assessment, the balance does not seem particularly
favourable to the auction either.
In general terms, this analysis suggests that, on average, the auction tends to be worse than grand-
fathering in terms of costs. Although this comparison has been made just for a numerical example, the
conclusions are very robust within the parameter range defined by condition (29) and for the three distri-
butional scenarios. This qualitative comparison is confirmed and even reinforced in Proposition 5, which
shows that in the conditions described above, the auctioning solution is less cost-eﬀective than the grandfa-
thering solution w.p.1. As it is shown in Corollary 2, this implies first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD)
of grandfathering over auctioning.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption (3), in cases 1, 2 and 3 of Assumption 2, the total cost of abatement
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when the permits are auctioned is higher than under grandfathering, i.e.,
(α)  (α) ∀α
Corollary 2 Under the conditions described in Proposition 5, the cumulative probability distribution
(CPD) of  under the grandfathering allocation first-order-stochastically dominates the corresponding
CPD under the auction ¥
Proposition 5 is remarkably strong since it states that, in any event, auctioning will always be beaten
by grandfathering from the point of view of cost. It deserves to be stressed that this does not only hold
in expected terms, but it holds true for every feasible realization of the types, as far as interior solution
is guaranteed. The main message of this result is that introducing an auction such that the leader in the
secondary market is also so in the auction can only worsen the results in terms of costs as compared to
grandfathering. Moreover, under interior solution, this result holds with certainty. The reason is that
the leader will have strong incentives to use his leadership to distort the market to own advantage and
such distortion will result in a cost increase. Corollary 2 translate this result in the standard concept of
FOSD.15
A clear-cut policy implication is that, with imperfect competition in the secondary market, switching
from grandfathering to auctioning is likely to worsen the situation (in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness) if it
cannot be avoided that the market power spills over to the auction.
5 Conclusions
There seems to be an increasing interest in auctioning as an alternative to grandfathering in order to
allocate emission permits. The EU ETS is a notable example of this tendency, as auctioning is being intro-
duced as the default allocation method based on the arguments that it ensures the eﬃciency, transparency
and simplicity of the system, creates incentives for investment and eliminates windfall profits. This paper
oﬀers a cautionary note on the eﬃciency argument by presenting a model in which two firms, one being a
leader and the other a follower, bid for permits in a uniform auction and then trade in a secondary market,
as is the case in the EU ETS.
As stated in Alvarez and André (2014), the chances of auctioning to outperform grandfathering come
essentially from the fact that, by means of the bids, the auction incorporates information that are only
privately observable and, hence, could not be used by the planner to implement a centralized allocation.
This is what we can call the "information eﬀect". On the other hand, the risk of the auction is that a firm
15As a matter of fact, the result in Proposition 5 is even stronger than FOSD since the latter does not preclude the
possibility that the cost under auctioning is lower than under grandfathering for some (small enough) range of the parameter
values, what is discarded in Proposition 5.
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with market power can use such power to distort the equilibrium in his own benefit, which we can call
"market power eﬀect". We have shown that the leaders’ ability to bid strategically while the follower is a
price taker exacerbates the market power eﬀect to the extent that it always outperforms the information
eﬀect and makes the auction be dominated with probability one. We have shown that this situation enables
the leader to obtain an ex-post optimal result in the sense that he can bid in such a way that he gets rid
of the consequences of incomplete information.
Since we have developed a highly simplified model, we should not take Proposition 5 as a quantitatively
exact forecast for a real life policy framework, but the essence of the message is still valid as a warning
about what we can expect from auctioning permits. Our central conclusion is that we cannot expect that
an auction "per se" has the property of providing more cost-eﬀective allocations of permits. Indeed, the
design of the auction and, specifically, its ability to preserve or dilute market power is a crucial element for
the comparison. As it is shown in Alvarez and André (2004), if the auction is capable of removing market
power, then there is a chance that the results under the auction will be more cost-eﬀective than under
grandfathering. If, on the contrary, the auction reproduces the leader and follower roles, our analysis
has demonstrated that one can only expect that this situation results in more costly outcomes than
grandfathering.
As a policy implication, the environmental authorities should pay attention to the auction design and
be cautious with those situations in which one big firms or a little amount of them could have enough
power to distort the auction result to reinforce their leadership position.
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6 Appendix 1: notation
— Fundamentals —
¯ Total amount of permits to be shared, exogenous.
  ∈ {} Firms:  and  denote Follower and Leader, resp.
 () =  −  Marginal abatement cost of firm , where  is the emission level.
 Total abatement cost of firm 
 =  +  Total abatement cost of the industry
, α = (  ) Firms’ types, random. The support of α belongs to Ω := [  + ]2.
{ | } =  +  Expectation of  conditional on  , assumed linear with coeﬀs.   
 ,  Business as usual and cost-eﬀective emissions of , resp.
ΘΘΘ Auxiliary coeﬃcients
— Secondary market —
1 1 Post-market holdings of permits for firm  and market price, resp.
Π (1 1α) Realized profit of firm .
 (0α) := Π (∗1 ∗1α) Realized profit of firm  (under eq. in the secondary market).
(the asterisk denotes equilibrium value).
 (0 ) Value function for firm  (valuation of initially getting 0 permits).
— Primary market (auctioning or grandfathering) —
0 Initial allocation of permits for firm  (under grand. or auctioning).
0 Price of permits at the auction.
 := 0¯  0s share of permits (,  under auctioning or grandf., resp.).
 (α) Monotone transformation of total abatement cost.
(incorporates secondary-market behaviour ).
 ( 0) Firm ’s bid (mapping from support of  to set of demand funct.)
0, 1, 2, 3 Auxiliary coeﬃcients of the leader’s optimal demand
Firm ’s bid (mapping from support of  to set of demand funct.)
 Diagonal of the support of types.
Ω Range of types under which a type- equilibrium takes place in the non-strategic auction ( = 1 2 3).
 {·} Expectation operator.
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7 Appendix 2: proofs
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The first-order condition (FOC) of problem (19) is
− 0 ·
∗
0 −
£¯− ∗ (0  )¤+ 0 ∗0 = 0,
where ∗ (  0) is given by (17). Using the expressions for  given in (12) together with the market-
clearing and rearranging, the FOC can be written as
2
5
∗ − 8¯5 +
3 ( + 2 )
5 −
9
5 0 = 0.
Using (17) and rearranging we get (20).
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume initially that the solution is interior (which we check below). Using (7) in (20) we get the following
value for the optimal price:
∗0 = 4 + 15 + 4 (11 +  ) − 44¯63 . (30)
Assume now the leader’s strategy is linear (we argue below that this is necessarily the case) and takes
the form ∗ (0 ) = 0+1¯+2+30. We now show that there exist values of the coeﬃcients
0, 1, 2, 3 such that the market clearing condition ∗ (0  )+∗ (0 ) = ¯ has ∗0 as a solution.
This means that, when  and  bid ∗ (0  ) and ∗ (0 ) respectively, ∗0 arises as a clearing price
for the auction. Using the expressions for ∗ (0  ) and ∗ (0 ) in the market clearing condition,
substituting (30) for 0 and collecting terms, we get the following equation:
 (43 + 18)
63 +0+
18 + 3 (5 + 44) + 9
63 +
 (72 +3)− 3
7 +
631 − 443 + 54
63
¯ = ¯.
For this equation to hold for any arbitrary pair (  ), we need that the, in the left-hand side, the
constant term and the coeﬃcients associated to  and  are equal to zero and the coeﬃcient associated
to ¯ is equal to one. From those conditions we get a system of four equations which has, as a unique
solution, 0 = −3(+11) ≤ 0, 1 = −3+11 ≤ 0, 2 = 6+214(+11) ≥ 0, 3 = −(18+9)4(+11) ≤ 0, where the signs
follow from the fact that, under Assumption 2,  only can be equal to 0 (in case 1) or 12 (in cases 2
and 3). The fact that ∗ (0 ) is necessarily linear comes from the fact that both ∗ (0  ) and ∗0
are linear and hence, in the systems of equations set above, any non-linear term must be zero to ensure
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that the market-clearing condition holds for any pair (  ).
Plugging (30) in the bidding function, we find the equilibrium allocation in the auction:
∗0 = ¯−2+3−(2+1)7 , ∗0 = 6¯+2+(2+1)−37  (31)
The third step is to show that ∗ (0  ) and ∗ (0 ) constitute an equilibrium of the game and
it is unique. By construction, ∗0 is an equilibrium price and ∗ is the best strategy for  for the same
arguments used in Section 3. So, we only have to show that ∗ (0 ) is the best strategy for , which
requires to prove that the value of ∗0 given in (31) solves (18). To prove this, note that, for a specific
value of  , solving (19) in terms of 0 is totally equivalent to solving it in terms of 0. Therefore, we
conclude that (21) provides an allocation for  that maximises  for any possible value of  , which
implies that it also maximises it on average and, therefore, he have solved (18). The equilibrium is unique
since both ∗ (0  ) and ∗ (0 ) are unique.
7.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Using (9), (10), (11), (30) and (31), and rearranging, we conclude that the occurrence of an interior solution
w.p.1 requires that the following conditions hold:
Pr
¡−13¯ ≤ 2 + (2 + 8) − 10 ≤ 8¯¢ = 1 (32)
Pr
¡−6¯ ≤ 2 + (2 + 1) − 3 ≤ ¯¢ = 1 (33)
Pr
¡
13¯ ≤ 10 + (13− 2 ) − 2
¢
= 1 (34)
Pr
¡
44¯ ≤ 4( + ( + 11) ) + 15
¢
= 1 (35)
The first condition guarantees interior solution for quantities in the secondary market16 (0 ≤ 1 ≤ ¯)
and the second does the same for the auction (0 ≤ 0 ≤ ¯). The third and fourth conditions ensure that
the price is non-negative in the secondary market and the auction respectively (1 ≥ 0, 0 ≥ 0).
To ensure that these inequalities hold w.p.1 we need to check that each of them holds true for the most
adverse realizations of the types. Under the three cases considered in Assumption 2, using the relevant
expressions for  and  conditions (32) to (35), collapse to the following conditions, all of which hold
under Assumption 3:
Case 1 (independent types): 2 ≤ ¯ ≤ 6344 + 22 ;
Case 2 ( eﬃcient): 2 ≤ ¯ ≤ 6344 ;
16Notice that condition (29) guarantees interior solution in the secondary market for any initial allocation of permits,
whereas (32) guarantees it only for the auction allocation considered in this section. Furthermore, we write the conditions in
terms of probabilities and not in terms of parameters, as in (29). In order to present these conditions in terms of parameters,
it suﬃces to consider the most adverse realizations for each inequality.
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Case 3 ( eﬃcient):  ≤ ¯ ≤ 6344 + 22 .
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Given the symmetry of cases 2 and 3, it is suﬃcient to prove the result for case 2. Using the expressions
for  under case 2 and  we have
 −  = ¯ − (6 + 3) ( − )
2¯ (6 + 3) ,
from which we obtain
 ≤  ⇐⇒  ≥  + 
where  := ¯ (6 + 3)−1 and the latter condition is true within the triangle delimited by the points
( +  ), ( +  ), ( +   +  − ). The area of this triangle is (−)22 and dividing by the area
of the relevant domain, which in this case is the triangle delimited by the points ( ), ( +  ) and
( +   + ), we obtain the probability of the event  ≤  :
Pr
³
 ≤ 
´
=
2 ( − )2
22 =
µ
6 + 3 − ¯
6 + 3
¶2
. (36)
Since the latter expression is decreasing in  and ¯, we can find the infimum value by setting them
a their highest possible values compatible with 29 , i.e., 2 = ¯ = 6344. Plugging these values in (36) we
get
¡
197
239
¢2 ' 068  1. By setting  = ¯ = 0 we obtain 1 as the supremum value.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
In case 1, using the definition of , (24), (31) and (6) we obtain a lower bound for the diﬀerence between
 and :
 −  = 2 +  +  + 6¯− 3
7¯ −
1
2
−  − 
2¯
=
4 + 2 +  − 5 + 5¯
14¯ ≥
5¯− 3
14¯
where the last inequality follows by setting  at its lowest possible value, , and  at its highest possible
value,  + . Using this expression for the lower bound and condition (29) we conclude   . Using
(24), (31) and noting that  = 05, we conclude
 −  = 4 + 2 + 2 − 6 + 5¯
14¯ ≥
5¯− 4
14¯ ≥ 0,
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where the first inequality follows by setting  = ,  =  +  and second inequality from (29).
In cases 2 and 3 the procedure is similar, using the adequate values for  and  as given in (25) and
(27) together with the relevant values of  according to (26), (28) and (22).
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The strategy of the proof is to show that (α)  (α) for all the relevant values of the parameters.
In turn, this is done by minimizing (α) − (α) in terms of  and  and showing that the
minimum value is positive, which implies that it is positive for any combination of  and  . First, note
that in the three cases included in Assumption 2 (α)−(α) is a continuous and bounded function
defined on a compact set and, therefore, we can use the Weierstrass theorem to state that there exists a
minimum in the relevant interval. Although the strategy of the proof is the same for all three cases, the
development is slightly diﬀerent for each case and so we consider them separately.
CASE 1:  and  are not correlated. Using (15), (23), (24) and (31), the diﬀerence between total
cost under auctioning and grandfathering can be written as
(α)− (α) = 1
196¯
£−242 − 482 + 88 − 2 ¡20 + 10 + 25¯¢
+2 ¡4 + 2 + 5¯¢+ 4 (2 + )2 + 252¯2 + 20¯ (2 + )i,
the sign of which is determined by the term in square brackets, which we denote as ∆1 (  ). For the
relevant values of the parameters we have ∆  0 and ∆  0, which implies that ∆ (  ) reaches a
minimum at (  ) = (  + ) . Using these values, we get ∆1 (  + ) = −402 − 30¯+252¯2,
which is always positive under the interior solution condition 2  ¯.
CASE 2:  ≤  . Using  = 3+26+3 together with (15), (23), (25) and (31), the diﬀerence of total
cost between both systems can be written as
(α)− (α) = 1
49¯2
©2 ¡−102 − 122 + 23 ¢+  £−2 ¡3 + 32¯¢+ 49¯ ¤
+ £2 ¡ + 27¯¢− 49¯ ¤+ 2¯2 £225 ( + ) + 442¤+2 ¡2 + 5¯¢ª
where := (6 + 3),  = (3 + 2). Denote as ∆2 (  ) the term in curly brackets, which determines
the sign of the whole expression. Now we solve the problem of minimizing ∆2 (  ) subject to  ≥ ,
 ≤  +  and  ≤  . We conclude that there are two candidates that satisfy the first-order Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. The first candidate is  = ,  =  +  and the second one is  =  =  + .17
For the first candidate we have
∆2 (  + ) =  £¯ (−45 + 2)− 10¤+ 2¯2 ¡225 ( + ) + 442¢  0,
17The second is a candidate only if  and ¯ are high enough as compared to .
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where the inequality comes from the fact that ∆2 (  + ) is increasing in ¯ for any ¯  2 (which
is a required condition to guarantee interior solution) and replacing ¯ by 2 we get ∆2 (  + ) 
2 ¡334 + 982¢  0. Analogously, for the second candidate we have
∆2 ( +   + ) = 2 £ − 5¯¤+ 2¯2 ¡225 ( + ) + 442¢  0
where, again, the inequality comes from the fact that ∆2 ( +   + ) is increasing in ¯ for any ¯  2
and replacing ¯ by 2 we get ∆2 ( +   + )  2 ¡5762 + 952 + 414¢  0.
CASE 3:  ≤ . Using  = 3+6+3 together with (15), (23), (27) and (31), the diﬀerence of total
cost between auctioning and grandfathering can be written as
(α)− (α) = 1
49¯2
©2 ¡−102 − 122 + 23 ¢
+ £49¯ −2 ¡3 + 3 + 32¯¢¤+  £2 ¡ +  + 27¯¢− 49¯¤
+( + ) ¡5¯+ ( + )¢+ 2¯2 [49 ( − )− 6]ª
where  := (6 + 3),  = (3 + ). Denote as ∆3 (  ) the term in curly brackets, which determines
the sign of the whole expression. We conclude that the only candidate that satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker
first-order conditions to minimise ∆3 (  ) subject to  ≥ ,  ≤ +  and  ≤  is  = + ,
 = . Evaluating ∆3 (  ) for this candidate we get
∆3 ( +  ) = −1022 + ¯ (45 + 47) + 2¯2 ¡225 ( + ) + 442¢
 2 [ (45 + 47 − 10) + (225 ( + ) + 44)]  0,
∆3 ( +  ) = −1022 + ¯ (45 + 47) + 2¯2 ¡225 ( + ) + 442¢
≥ −1022 + 22 (45 + 47) + 42 ¡225 ( + ) + 442¢  0
where the first inequality comes from the fact that ∆3 (  + ) is increasing in ¯ and then we can use
¯ = 2 to obtain a lower bound and the second inequality follows simply by using the expression for 
and rearranging.
7.7 Proof of Corollary 2
Consider an arbitrary value of the (monotone transformation of) total cost , say e. For grandfathering,
denote as Φ
³
˜
´
:=
n
α  (α) ≤ ˜
o
the set of values of the types, (  ), such that the cost under
grandfathering is not larger than ˜. Similarly, define Φ
³
˜
´
:=
n
α  (α) ≤ ˜
o
for the auction. From
29
Proposition 5 we know that, for any realization of the types, we have (α) ≤ (α). In particular,
this will be the case for those types contained in Φ
³
˜
´
. Then, we conclude that Φ
³
˜
´
is included in
Φ
³
˜
´
or, in other words, 
³
˜
´
≤ 
³
˜
´
for any value of ˜, where  and  are the distribution
functions of  under auctioning and grandfathering respectively, which implies FOSD of  over .
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